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JOINT INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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From: 31 August 1950  
To : 6 September 1950  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Department of the Army  
Washington 25, D. C.  
7 September 1950

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JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. The Soviet armed forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. There are no indications of imminent Soviet hostilities.
- b. There are no firm indications of Soviet or Chinese Communist intentions to intervene in Korea, but material assistance to the North Koreans is evidently continuing.
- c. There are no indications of an imminent attack on Formosa. Although weather and sea conditions will probably be less favorable for an attack after mid-September, the period from late September through early October may not be too unfavorable. After mid-October sea conditions will probably become increasingly unfavorable for an attack. However, an attack after this date is not precluded by weather and sea conditions.
- d. There are continuing indications of increasing preparedness of Soviet and Satellite forces in Europe, particularly of logistical build-up.

2. SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

- a. Summary.--There are no additional reports of a Chinese Communist build-up in Manchuria. Work on airfields for North Korean forces is continuing. Preparations by the Viet Minh for an attack on French lines of communication are increasing. Large shipments of equipment to Soviet forces in the southwestern portion of the Soviet Zone of Germany have been reported. A tribal revolt in Iran does not appear to be indicative of general Kurdish uprisings.

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b. Operations of enemy component elements.

- (1) KOREA.--See current situation reports. Soviet supply of the North Koreans appears to be continuing although the extent of current assistance is not known. Work on airfields for North Korean forces is continuing. There are no additional indications of a build-up of Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria and reports that Chinese Communist reinforcements have arrived in Korea are not confirmed.
- (2) CHINA.--There are no indications of an imminent attack on Formosa.
- (3) INDO-CHINA.--Possible movements of Chinese Communist forces somewhat closer to the Indo-China border have not materially increased their capabilities to invade. Recent rumors that a Chinese Communist invasion is imminent are not confirmed. Viet Minh preparations for an attack on French lines of communication have increased.
- (4) GERMANY.--There are additional indications that Soviet forces are preparing for large-scale maneuvers in the near future. Reports of unusually large shipments of equipment and supplies into the southwestern portion of the Soviet Zone during August indicate either preparations for large-scale exercises or a further build-up of Soviet stockpiles.
- (5) SOUTHEAST EUROPE.--Shortages of gasoline and unusual conservation measures are not general throughout Southeast Europe, but shortages continue in Rumania where gasoline has been rationed. There have been no indications of unusual troop activity in the area.
- (6) GREECE.--There are indications of increased guerrilla infiltration into Greece for subversive purposes, but present information does not indicate that intensified Greek guerrilla military operations are imminent.
- (7) IRAN.--A Kurdish tribe which is in revolt against a government order to surrender its arms has long been a troublesome element. Recent Soviet propaganda inciting Kurdish revolts in the Near East may have contributed to the incident, but it does not appear to indicate general Kurdish uprisings.

3. See Tab "A" attached.

4. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES.--No significant change is evident, but maneuver preparations in Germany are increasing the Soviet capability for combat operations.

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TAB "A"

REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee  
6 September 1950

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. There is little new information on Soviet and Chinese Communist activities which is indicative of intentions in Korea.

- (1) It is evident that North Korean operations on the current scale could only be sustained with outside logistical assistance. Soviet supply of the North Koreans thus appears to be continuing although concrete evidence of the extent of current assistance is lacking. There have been recent reports of the movement of convoys into Korea from Antung, Manchuria.
- (2) There have been additional reports that work on airfields for North Korean forces is continuing. The shooting down of a single Soviet bomber in the area of military operations in Korea is not in itself an indication that the Soviets intend to employ their own forces in Korea.
- (3) No new reports have been received on a build-up of Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria. There is no confirmation of a [ ] report that Chinese Communist armies have entered Korea. It is evident that North Korean units are kept well supplied with poorly trained but adequate replacements, but there have been no indications of the organization of well trained strategic reserves in the rear areas.

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b. Available information continues to show no indications of an imminent attack on Formosa. Although weather and sea conditions will probably be less favorable for an attack after mid-September, the period from late September through early October may not be too unfavorable. After mid-October sea conditions will probably become increasingly unfavorable for an attack.

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c. [ ] a Chinese Communist invasion of Indo-China is scheduled to begin about 10 September and that local Chinese Communists and the Soviet Legation are talking of an imminent "big surprise." [ ] have reported a movement of Chinese Communist forces somewhat closer to the border of Indo-China, but this information does not indicate a major redeployment of Chinese Communist forces or a material increase in their capabilities to invade Indo-China. There have been no other indications that the Chinese Communists are planning to invade, although

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an attack with virtually no advance notice is possible. There have been increased preparations by the Viet Minh for an attack on French lines of communication, particularly in the Caobang-Langson area.

d. The Soviets are reported to have ordered five vessels, described as transports, to depart from Odessa for the Far East during the first two weeks of September. Although this report is not confirmed, such a movement would be consistent with other indications that the Soviets are increasing their shipping facilities in the Far East, probably because of the inadequacy of rail transport.

e. There is no new information with regard to Chinese Communist intentions towards Tibet or Burma.

f. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) There are no firm indications of a Soviet or Chinese Communist intention to intervene in Korea, although material assistance to the North Koreans is evidently continuing.
- (2) Available information does not indicate an imminent attack on Formosa.
- (3) Capabilities of the Viet Minh have continued to increase but there are no reliable indications of an imminent Chinese Communist offensive in Indo-China.

## 2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. Reports from Eastern European countries indicate that shortages of gasoline and unusual conservation measures are not general throughout the area but appear to be confined to Rumania and the Soviet Zone of Germany. Gasoline rationing was imposed in Rumania on 30 August. In Hungary, a subterranean fuel depot has been transferred from Hungarian to Soviet Army control, but no gasoline shortage has been noted.

b. In Germany there are additional indications that Soviet forces are preparing for larger scale maneuvers in the near future, with the attendant increased capability for combat operations. In the Ohrdruf-Eisenach area (in the southwestern portion of the Soviet Zone near the boundary of the U. S. Zone), unconfirmed reports indicate that there was an unusually large build-up of equipment and supplies during the first two weeks of August. Shipments into the area are reported to have included 60 carloads of spare parts, 18 carloads of building equipment, 65 carloads of ammunition, and 300,000 gallons of gasoline. Some of these items are considered to be far in excess of needs for present training activity, and the stockpiling of gasoline in the area has been reported, although the shipment mentioned is not in itself an excessive quantity for maneuver purposes. This area now

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contains the largest concentration of Soviet forces in Germany and was the area in which a CPX was conducted in June, involving all Soviet armies in Germany. It appears that the increase of supplies in the area is probably intended for large-scale maneuvers or represents a further build-up of stockpiles in Germany. Continued shipments of this type into forward areas could be a preliminary to hostilities, but there have been no reports of a general forward movement of supplies in Germany. Gasoline reserves in the Soviet Zone have been increased, however.

c. At the recent National Front Congress in East Germany, announcement was made of the Communist program to be directed against West Germany. The program includes: (1) the incitement of strikes, especially in ports and heavy industries; (2) attempts to convert former Army officers to the Communist cause; (3) mass demonstrations in West German cities in defiance of legal regulations; and (4) sharp pressure against recruits for the planned expansion of the West German police forces. This program is a continuation of policies laid down at the July Communist Party congress in Berlin and does not represent any change in announced East German Communist plans.

d. There have been no indications of unusual military activity in Southeast Europe. Rumors of the movement of Soviet equipment in Hungary are believed to be the result of Hungarian Army field maneuvers, some of which have been observed in southwestern Hungary.

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f. In Iran, the Kurdish Javanrudi tribe is reported to have refused compliance with a government order to turn in its arms. Soviet propaganda designed to incite the Kurds against Iran has continued despite the present Soviet policy of friendliness towards the Iranian government. The Javanrudi tribe has been particularly troublesome in the past and has resisted several previous efforts of the government to disarm them. Because of this background, it appears probable that the current trouble is similar to previous difficulties and not the beginning of general Kurdish uprisings in the Near East. Soviet propaganda may have contributed to the incident, however.

g. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) There are no conclusive indications of imminent Soviet hostilities in Western Europe, the Balkans or the Near East.

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- (2) There are continuing indications of Soviet military preparations, particularly of logistical build-up.
- (3) An attack in any of these areas could occur without additional warning.

*John Weckerling*  
JOHN WECKERLING  
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Chairman, Joint Intelligence  
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